The Structure of Online Consumer Communication Networks by Dellaert, B.G.C. (Benedict) et al.
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen – van Hout,  
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Benedict G.C. Dellaert 
 
The Structure of Online Consumer 
Communication Networks 
 
RM/06/028 
 
 
JEL code: A14, C79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maastricht research school of Economics 
of TEchnology and ORganizations 
 
Universiteit Maastricht 
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
P.O. Box 616 
NL - 6200 MD Maastricht 
 
phone : ++31 43 388 3830 
fax : ++31 43 388 4873 
 
 
 
 
 
The Structure of Online
Consumer Communication Networks
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen - van Hout∗ P. Jean-Jacques Herings†
Benedict G.C. Dellaert‡
July 12, 2006
Abstract
In this paper we study the structure of the bilateral communication links within
Online Consumer Communication Networks (OCCNs), such as virtual communities.
Compared to the offline world, consumers in online networks are highly flexible to
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choose their communication partners and little is known about how this affects commu-
nication exchange structures. We analyze these structures by using a general approach
from the game-theoretic literature of social and economic network formation where
individuals trade off the cost of forming and maintaining links against the potential
rewards of doing so, which results in a stable network structure. In our analysis, a com-
bination of aspects common to OCCNs is incorporated that has not been investigated
in this literature until now. First, the negative externality of communication specificity
is included in the sense that the more direct connections an individual has to maintain
with other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link within her
total time available. Therefore, the additive value per individual of her communications
declines with an increasing number of links, and she also derives less additive value
per individual from others with an increasing number of links. Second, a distinction
is made between the social and informational value of communication, where informa-
tional communication value is assumed to be transferable via indirect links, whereas
social communication value is not transferable. Analytical results are derived by us-
ing the concept of pairwise stability. A tendency towards fragmented pairwise stable
structures - consisting of small, disjoint (star) components - is discovered, which can
be attributed to the joint effect of the two aspects mentioned. We demonstrate that
only some of the pairwise stable structures provide optimal welfare (total payoffs), and
that the relative focus on informational versus social value of communication affects
this welfare.
JEL Classification: A14, C79
Keywords: Consumers, Communication Specificity, Social vs. Informational Com-
munication Value, Online Network Formation, Game Theory
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1 Introduction
The large-scale availability of high-speed Internet allows a growing number of consumers to
easily communicate with like-minded individuals based on shared interests around for ex-
ample products, consumption activities, or personal conditions (e.g., Algesheimer, Dholakia,
and Herrmann, 2005; Dellarocas, 2003). Web sites such as www.saabnet.com,
www.ediets.com/community/, and www.healthboards.com offer online platforms on which
consumers share information that supports their decisions. We refer to the individuals and
their interactions on such websites as Online Consumer Communication Networks (OCCNs).
In this paper we study the structure of the bilateral communication links within OCCNs.
Compared to the offline world, consumers in online networks are highly flexible to choose their
communication partners and little is known about how this affects communication structures.
In our analysis, a combination of aspects common to OCCNs is incorporated that has not
been investigated in the literature before. First, we present a game-theoretical model for
communication network formation that features link specificity in the sense that the more
direct connections an individual has to maintain with other individuals, the less she is able
to specify her attention per link within her total time available. Therefore, her additive value
per link for others declines and she also derives less additive value from links with others.
Second, we realize that as soon as the value derived from communication is not only social
but also contains an informational component, this value is transferable via indirect links.
This is more prominently so in online communication than in offline communication since
information can more easily be forwarded to others. However, also in this forwarding process,
specificity plays a role. The combination of these two features, specificity and transferability,
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has a fragmentizing effect on network structure and consequently welfare implications, which
means that the informational versus social orientation of an OCCN could be of managerial
concern.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 shortly reviews the existent literature and
illustrates our contribution, Section 3 deals with the case of communication having social
value only in order to illustrate the impact of link specificity on structure, Section 4 deals
with the case of communication from which both social and informational value is derived
in order to illustrate the impact of value transferability on structure, Section 5 deals with
welfare implications, and Section 6 concludes and offers directions for further research.
2 Literature review
Research in the emerging area of online communication networks initially was largely con-
ceptual in nature (e.g., Dellarocas, 2003; Hagel and Armstrong, 1997; Wellman et al., 1996;
Butler, 2001). More recently however, scholars have focused on the question why individuals
choose to participate in, and contribute to OCCNs highlighting various individual motives
including informational value, social value and self discovery (e.g., Dholakia et al., 2004;
McLure Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Social influence variables such as identification with the
group (social identity) and group norms have also been found to play a role in individuals’
participation behavior (Bagozzi and Dholakia, 2002).
The current paper takes a complementary approach to understanding OCCNs by fo-
cusing on the structure of the underlying networks. This structure can determine impor-
tant outcome variables such as the extent to which social and informational value is shared
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throughout the network, and how it is distributed.
This type of analysis is related to work in organization research that has addressed ques-
tions like the degree of centralization in virtual organizations (e.g., Ahuja and Carley, 1999).
In contrast to this work in organization however, we address the case in which individuals
participate in an OCCN on a voluntary basis and do not necessarily share the same common
purpose and/or obtain compensation from their organizations for participating, as do, for
example, virtual teams (Lipnack and Stamps, 2000).
For this reason, and because of earlier research findings emphasizing that individuals may
have various motives for participation in OCCNs, we allow for two categories of individual
participation value in our analysis: (1) social and (2) informational value. These two cate-
gories are largely representative of most individual-level benefits of participating in OCCNs
. Social value is related to the fact that individuals may simply enjoy communicating with
others (for example because they find it entertaining, or because they feel it enhances their
self-worth; e.g., Hennig-Thurau et al., 2004). Informational value refers to the fact that con-
sumers may obtain new valuable knowledge from other consumers when they communicate
in an online exchange. Typically, informational communication value or knowledge can be
transferred relatively easily to third parties through indirect links, whereas social communi-
cation value is even more personal and therefore hardly transferable. This transferability is
an example of a positive network externality (e.g., Asvanund et al., 2004).
To analyze the underlying structure of OCCNs we develop an analytical model for the
formation of links in online OCCNs that allows us to understand the relative impact of social
and informational member orientation on the network structure in an OCCN. In this model,
we interpret the formation of OCCNs as a type of non-cooperative network formation pro-
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cess in which individuals choose to create links, only if the participants in the link benefit
from doing so (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). This way of modelling network formation is
more appropriate in the online context than in the offline context, since in OCCN formation,
it is much easier for individuals to strategically choose their communication contacts com-
pared to the offline case. The reason is that in the offline world consumers are much more
constrained by geographical distance and by social networks that are already in place (e.g.,
family structures).
We distinguish between two types of communication in OCCNs. First, an individual can
choose to communicate to all other individuals simultaneously. In this case no personal,
bilateral interaction takes place between individuals (e.g., a question is placed on a notice
board). We do not interpret such communication as a bilateral exchange link between
individuals. For example, as soon as an individual enters or subscribes to a virtual community
or e-mail list, this communication becomes available to her. In our analysis we focus on a
second type of communication, that requires that two individuals decide to communicate
to each other. In this case, individuals can choose to communicate with selected other
participants. Since this communication is bilateral, we assume that only those participants
involved in the communication can obtain direct value from it. This is due to the specificity
of the exchanged text, that is unique for the relationship (the exchanged text may still be
available to all other individuals as well and thus provide a common indirect value). The
second type of communication is most relevant for explaining potential structural differences
between networks because it differs between individuals. Therefore, we focus on it in our
analysis.
In fact, this type of communication represents the main explanation for non-completeness
6
of OCCNs because it is a source of negative externalities (e.g., Asvanund et al., 2004): the
more direct connections an individual has to maintain with other individuals, the less she is
able to specify her attention per link within her total time available. Therefore, her additive
value for others declines and she herself also derives less additive value from others (Kvassov,
2002; Currarini, 2002; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).
3 Social value
Although we expect that OCCNs will typically combine social and informational value as-
pects in their communication, we first deal with the simpler case in which only social value
is derived from communication. This approach allows us to illustrate the separate impact of
link specificity on structure and welfare. The externalities of link formation are much more
crucial in our context than in the co-author setting, which has been the subject of investi-
gation in earlier research (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). In the communication context no
benefits arise from individual contributions per se. The reason is that communication is only
valuable if it is two-sided, whereas each co-author can write independently. The objective
of this section therefore is to propose a model for network formation in OCCNs with only
social value from communication. We also develop an appropriate stability concept for this
case and the large category of stable network structures is characterized.
3.1 Model
Consider a community of agents N = {1, ...n} , n ≥ 3. A direct link gi,j between agents i and
j in this community (i, j ∈ N ; i 6= j) can be interpreted as a virtual exchange relationship
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between i and j which is established if they both wish the link. Virtual exchange relationships
are expressed by undirected links, for any two agents i and j, gi,j = gj,i.
In case of an isolated relationship where communication has only social value, j derives
social value V s > 0 from i. However, maintenance of the relationship between i and j
costs time: both agents are assumed to divide their available sending time as well as their
available receiving time equally among all their relationships, as a result of which the value V s
is divided proportionally. This is due to the fact that although the agents represent constant
potential value for each other, time investment of both sender and receiver is needed in order
to make the potential value specific and hence useful for the receiver. Therefore, the payoff
for agent i is given by
Πi (g) =
∑
j∈NNi (g)
V s
µNi (g) · µNj (g)
(1)
if µNi (g) > 0, and Πi (g) = 0 if µ
N
i (g) = 0, where gi,j in link structure g indicates with a 1 or
a 0 whether i is directly linked to j or not (by definition, gi,i = 0, as agents do not establish
communication links with themselves); NNi (g) is the set of agents with whom i has a direct
link, where agent j is a neighbor of agent i if j ∈ NNi (g), and µNi (g) =
∣∣NNi (g)∣∣ is the
number of neighbors of agent i, which can also be referred to as the degree of i ; and V s > 0
denotes the social value that i derives from observing j if all attention of the community
were going to the social value of communication and neither i nor j were linked to any other
agent.1
1For comparison: the payoff function in the co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) can be
written as
Πi (g) =
∑
j∈NNi (g)
(
V s
µNi (g)
+
V s
µNj (g)
+
V s
µNi (g) · µNj (g)
)
.
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For the model thus described stable network structures can be predicted to emerge by
using the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), where a network struc-
ture is stable if no single agent can strictly improve her payoff by deleting one of her direct
links and no pair of agents can strictly improve her sum of payoffs while each of the two
members is at least indifferent by creating a direct link between the two members. This
concept differs from a Nash solution in the sense that it only assumes stability against de-
viations of exactly one link (which involves the permission of two agents in the case of link
formation), whereas the Nash network is stable against individual deviations of any size. In
our notation, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 (pairwise stability) The structure g is pairwise stable if for all i, j ∈ N
with gi,j = 1 it holds that
Πi (g) ≥ Πi (g′) and Πj (g) ≥ Πj (g′) ,
where g′ is such that g′i,j = 0 and g
′
k,l = gk,l for all {k, l} 6= {i, j}, and for all i, j ∈ N with
gi,j = 0 it holds that
Πi (g) > Πi (g
′) or
Πj (g) > Πj (g
′) or
(Πi (g) = Πi (g
′) and Πj (g) = Πj (g′)) ,
where g′ is such that g′i,j = 1 and g
′
k,l = gk,l for all {k, l} 6= {i, j}.
3.2 Results
We prove that the class of pairwise stable network structures can be characterized by two
easily verifiable conditions: (i) they are what we will call equal neighbor degree structures,
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meaning that everybody has at least one neighbor and every neighbor of agent i has the
same degree, and (ii) there is at most a difference of one between the degrees of agents in
the same component.
Definition 2 (equal neighbor degree structure) A structure g is an equal neighbor de-
gree structure when it holds for each agent i that µNi (g) ≥ 1 and for all agents j, j′ ∈ NNi (g)
that µNj (g) = µ
N
j′ (g).
Definition 3 (component) A component in a network g is a maximal set of agents C ⊆ N
who are connected to one another directly or indirectly, so for each i, j ∈ C there exists a
sequence of agents k1, . . . , km ∈ C for whom it holds that gi,k1 = gk1,k2 = ... = gkm−1,km =
gkm,j = 1.
First consider the following lemma, in which the own degree of agent i is denoted by di
and her neighbors’ degree by ei.
Lemma 4 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it is an equal neighbor degree structure
where it holds for each not directly linked pair of agents i, j that
ei ≤ dj or ej ≤ di or (ei = dj + 1 and ej = di + 1) . (2)
Proof. (⇐=) Assume that g is an equal neighbor degree structure where for each not directly
linked pair of agents i, j Condition (2) is satisfied. The payoff of an agent k as expressed in
Eq. (1) reduces to dkV
s/(dkek), so agent k does not want to delete a link, for
dk
V s
dkek
≥ (dk − 1) V
s
(dk − 1) ek .
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Moreover, no link between any pair of agents i, j will be created if it will make either i or j
strictly worse off or both of them equally well off. Therefore, no link is created if
V s
ei
> di
V s
(di + 1) ei
+
V s
(di + 1) (dj + 1)
or (3)
V s
ej
> dj
V s
(dj + 1) ej
+
V s
(di + 1) (dj + 1)
or (4)
(
V s
ei
= di
V s
(di + 1) ei
+
V s
(di + 1) (dj + 1)
and
V s
ej
= dj
V s
(dj + 1) ej
+
V s
(di + 1) (dj + 1)
)
. (5)
The following illustrates that ei ≤ dj implies (3).
ei ≤ dj =⇒ di(dj + 1) + ei < (di + 1)(dj + 1) =⇒ di (dj + 1) + ei
(di + 1) (dj + 1) ei
<
1
ei
.
Analogously, it can be shown that ej ≤ di implies (4), and (ei = dj + 1) and (ej = di + 1)
implies (5). Therefore, g is pairwise stable.
( =⇒ ) Assume that the structure g is pairwise stable. First, suppose that there is an
agent i for whom it holds that µNi (g) = 0. Then her payoff would strictly improve from
a link with some other agent k. It is obvious that also k ’s payoff would strictly increase if
µNk (g) = 0, which contradicts pairwise stability, so consider the case where µ
N
k (g) ≥ 1. The
payoff of k without this link equals
∑
j∈NNk (g)
V s
µNk (g) · µNj (g)
=
V s
µNk (g)
 ∑
j∈NNk (g)
1
µNj (g)
 ,
whereas by linking with i it would become
∑
j∈NNk (g)
V s
(µNk (g) + 1) · µNj (g)
+
V s
(µNk (g) + 1) · 1
=
V s
(µNk (g) + 1)
 ∑
j∈NNk (g)
1
µNj (g)
+ 1

≥ V
s
µNk (g)
 ∑
j∈NNk (g)
1
µNj (g)
 .
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The inequality follows from the observation that the expression before the inequality equals
V s times the average of the terms 1/µNj (g) and 1, the expression after the inequality is equal
to V s times the average of the terms 1/µNj (g), and that 1 ≥ 1/µNj (g) for all j ∈ NNj (g). This
also contradicts pairwise stability. It follows that µNi (g) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N .
Secondly, suppose that for some i it does not hold that µNj (g) is constant for all j ∈
NNi (g). Then there is an agent k ∈ NNi (g) such that
µNk (g) >
∑
j∈NNi (g) µ
N
j (g)
µNi (g)
. (6)
The payoff for i is given by
∑
j∈NNi (g)
V s
µNi (g) · µNj (g)
=
V s
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
1
µNj (g)
,
whereas by deleting the link with k, the payoff for i would become
∑
j∈NNi (g)
V s
(µNi (g)− 1) · µNj (g)
− V
s
(µNi (g)− 1) · µNk (g)
=
V s
(µNi (g)− 1)
 ∑
j∈NNi (g)
1
µNj (g)
− 1
µNk (g)

>
V s
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
1
µNj (g)
,
where the last inequality follows immediately from the interpretation of the last two terms
as V s times an average of numbers 1/µNj (g). This contradicts pairwise stability, so µ
N
j (g) =
µNj′ (g) for all j, j
′ ∈ NNi (g). We have shown that a pairwise stable structure is an equal
neighbor degree structure.
Finally, suppose that there exists a not directly linked pair i, j for which Condition (2)
is not satisfied, implying
ei ≥ dj + 1 and ej ≥ di + 1 and (ei > dj + 1 or ej > di + 1) . (7)
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Then i and j want to create a link between them, since this would cause the payoff for agent
i to become
di
V s
(di + 1) ei
+
V s
(di + 1) (dj + 1)
≥ di V
s
(di + 1) ei
+
V s
(di + 1) ei
=
V s
ei
,
and for agent j to become
dj
V s
(dj + 1) ej
+
V s
(dj + 1) (di + 1)
≥ dj V
s
(dj + 1) ej
+
V s
(dj + 1) ej
=
V s
ej
,
where according to the last condition in (7) at least one of the ≥ - signs is strict. This
contradicts pairwise stability too. Therefore, g is an equal neighbor degree structure with
ei ≤ dj or ej ≤ di or (ei = dj + 1 and ej = di + 1)
for each not directly linked pair of agents i, j.
Condition 2 in Lemma 4 can be further simplified as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it is an equal neighbor degree
structure where it holds for each pair of agents k, l in the same component that
|dk − dl| ≤ 1. (8)
Proof. Considering Lemma 4, it is sufficient to show that in an equal neighbor degree
structure Condition 2 holds for each not directly linked pair i, j,
ei ≤ dj or ej ≤ di or (ei = dj + 1 and ej = di + 1) (9)
if and only if Condition (8) is satisfied for each pair k, l in the same component,
|dk − dl| ≤ 1.
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(⇐=) Assume an equal neighbor degree structure where for each pair k, l in the same
component Condition (8) is satisfied. Let i, j be any not directly linked pair. If ei ≤ dj,
Condition (2) is satisfied. If not, then ei > dj and we can derive by applying Condition (8)
twice that
ej ≤ dj + 1 ≤ ei ≤ di + 1.
If ej ≤ di, Condition (2) is satisfied. If not, then ej = di + 1 and Condition (2) is satisfied if
it also holds that ei = dj + 1. Suppose not, then ei ≥ dj + 2 and we can derive by applying
Condition (8) that
ei ≥ dj + 2 ≥ (ej − 1) + 2 = di + 2,
which contradicts Condition (8). Therefore, Condition (2) is satisfied.
( =⇒ ) Assume an equal neighbor degree structure where for each not directly linked pair
i, j Condition (2) is satisfied. Let k, l be any pair in the same component. There exists at
least one path between k and l. Assume that the number of other agents on any of these
paths is odd. Due to the equal neighbor degree structure it holds that
ek = el and dk = dl,
so Condition (8) is satisfied. Assume that the number of other agents on all of these paths is
even. If the component consists of only k and l, then Condition (8) trivially holds. Otherwise,
there either exists an agent m ∈ NNl (g) , m 6= k, or there exists an agent n ∈ NNk (g) , n 6= l.
Without loss of generality, assume the former is the case. Since all paths between k and l
have an even number of other agents, it follows that m is not directly linked to k. Due to
the equal neighbor degree structure it holds that
ek = em, dm = dk, em = dl, and el = dm.
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Suppose that Condition (8) is not satisfied, so without loss of generality
dl ≥ dk + 2.
Then it follows that
ek ≥ dm + 2 and em ≥ dk + 2,
which contradicts Condition (2) for k,m. Consequently, Condition (8) is satisfied.
The following examples illustrate the wide range of structures thus proven to be pairwise
stable in the social value case.
Definition 6 (complete structure) A structure g is complete if all agents are connected,
so for all i, j ∈ N it holds that gi,j = 1.
Corollary 7 The complete structure is pairwise stable, for it is an equal neighbor degree
structure where it holds for each pair of agents k, l in the single component that
|dk − dl| = 0.
Definition 8 (wheel structure) A structure g is a wheel if it has exactly n links and there
exists a sequence of different agents k1, ..., kn ∈ N for whom it holds that gk1,k2 = gk2,k3 =
... = gkn−1,kn = gkn,k1 = 1.
Corollary 9 The wheel is pairwise stable, for it is an equal neighbor degree structure where
it holds for each pair of agents k, l in the single component that
|dk − dl| = 0.
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Definition 10 (regular structure) A structure g is regular if it exists of one component
and for each agent i ∈ N it holds that di = d.
Corollary 11 The regular structure is pairwise stable, for it is an equal neighbor degree
structure where it holds for each pair of agents k, l in the single component that
|dk − dl| = 0.
Example 12 A non-regular structure that is pairwise stable is given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: A non-regular pairwise stable structure.
Example 13 A structure consisting of multiple components that is pairwise stable is given
in Figure 2.
Example 14 A “small world” is a structure with local clusters of highly interlinked agents
together with agents that link the various clusters. As a consequence, although most agents
are not directly connected, every agent is indirectly linked to every other agent by a relatively
small number of steps. A “small world” structure that is pairwise stable is given in Figure 3.
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Figure 2: A multiple-component pairwise stable structure.
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Figure 3: A “small world” pairwise stable structure.
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4 Informational as well as social value
This section now introduces the case in which both social and informational value is derived
from communication. Thus, we can illustrate the impact of value transferability on structure
and welfare along with the effect of specificity. More specifically, we make a distinction be-
tween social and informational value derived from communication, where only informational
value is transferable through the network. For example, social value from communication
between two Saab enthusiasts only exists for the two communication partners, but informa-
tional value (e.g, about a solution to a technical problem) can (partly) exist for others in
the network. After proposing a model for network formation in this setting, the pairwise
stable network structures will be characterized again. We demonstrate that the set of stable
structures is much more limited in range than in the social value setting.
4.1 Model
Consider a community of agents N = {1, . . . , n} , n ≥ 3. A direct link gi,j between agents i
and j in this community (i, j ∈ N ; i 6= j) can be interpreted as a virtual exchange relationship
between i and j which is established if they both wish the link. Virtual exchange relationships
are expressed by undirected links, for any two agents i and j, gi,j = gj,i, and gi,i = 0.
In case of an isolated relationship where communication has only social value, an agent
derives social value V s > 0 from the other agent. In case of an isolated relationship where
communication has only informational value, an agent derives informational value V i > 0
from the other agent. Both agents are assumed to give relative attention to informational
and social value in the proportions α and 1 − α respectively, where α is assumed to be
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constant satisfying 0 < α < 1.2 Maintenance of the relationship between i and j costs time:
both agents are assumed to divide their available sending time as well as their available
receiving time equally among all their relationships, as a result of which the value V i and
V s is divided proportionally. Moreover, informational value is, without any decay except for
this time division, transferred to third parties through indirect links (paths of links), whereas
social value is not transferable. Therefore, the payoff for agent i is given by
Πi (g) = α
∑
j∈Ni(g)
∑
p∈Pi,j(g)
V i
µNi (g) · µNj (g) ·
∏
k∈P˘
(µNk (g))
2
+(1− α)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
V s
µNi (g) · µNj (g)
, (10)
if µNi (g) > 0, and Πi (g) = 0 if µ
N
i (g) = 0, where α is the proportion of communication
through each link in the community that concerns product-, service- or firm-related infor-
mation and 1 − α is the proportion of communication through each link in the community
that concerns social interaction; Ni (g) is the set of agents with whom i has either a direct
or an indirect link; Pi,j (g) is the set of paths between i and j, where a path is defined as a
sequence of consecutive edges without repeated nodes, and P˘ is the set of agents on path p
between i and j excluding i and j themselves.
For the model thus described stable network structures are again predicted to emerge
by using the concept of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), where a network
structure is stable if no single agent can strictly improve her payoff by deleting one of her
direct links and no pair of agents can strictly improve her sum of payoffs while each of the
2The results in the case where the value derived from knowledge exchange are only informational (α = 1)
slightly differ from those in this mixed case (α < 1). Specifically, it appears that structures also containing
one four-agent star component can be pairwise stable.
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two members is at least indifferent by creating a direct link between the two members.
4.2 Results
It can be proven that the pairwise stable structures consist of small star components.
Definition 15 (star) A structure g is a star if it has exactly n − 1 links and there exists
an agent j for whom it holds that gj,i = 1 for all i 6= j. Similarly, a component C is a star if
it has exactly |C| − 1 links and it contains an agent j for whom it holds that gj,i = 1 for any
other i ∈ C. Agent j is called the center agent whereas the other agents are the periphery
agents of the star.
First consider the following lemma in which it is shown that the star structure becomes
unstable when there are more than three agents.
Lemma 16 The star structure is pairwise stable if and only if n = 3.
Proof. From the star structure, it is not beneficial for any of the periphery agents to delete
her link with the center agent as then her payoff will be zero. For the center agent, deleting
a link with any of the periphery agents will provide her with the same payoff. To verify
this result, it is crucial to observe that the center agent is not involved in any indirect links
to other agents in star structures. Periphery agent i will not create a link with another
periphery agent i’ if and only if
αV i
(
1
n− 1 +
(n− 2)
(n− 1)2
)
+ (1− α)V s 1
n− 1 ≥
αV i
(
1
2 (n− 1) +
1
8 (n− 1) +
1
4
+
1
4 (n− 1)2 +
(n− 3)
2 (n− 1)2 +
(n− 3)
8 (n− 1)2
)
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+(1− α)V s
(
1
2 (n− 1) +
1
4
)
⇐⇒ αV i (4− n) + (1− α)V s (3− n) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ n ≤ 3.
Since we assumed societies to consist of at least three agents, it holds that n = 3.
Now the following proposition can be proven.
Proposition 17 A structure is pairwise stable if and only if it consists of disjoint star
components of two or three agents.
Proof. (⇐=) It is not beneficial for any of the periphery agents in a star component to
delete her single link as then her payoff will be zero. Equivalently, for the center agent in a
three-agent component, deleting a link with any of the two periphery agents is not beneficial
as it will provide her with the same payoff.
With respect to link creation, apart from links between periphery agents from the same
star that are eliminated by Lemma 16, the following cases (a)− (f) exist:
2 3c 3p
2 (pair agent) (a) (b) (c)
3c (center agent of three-agent star) x (d) (e)
3p (periphery agent of three-agent star) x x (f)
For each of these cases, it can be proven by evaluating the payoffs with and without the link
that no link will be created: in case (a), a pair agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
2
+
1
4
+
1
8
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
4
)
≤ αV i + (1− α)V s,
in case (b), the pair agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
2
+
1
6
+
1
18
+
1
18
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
6
)
< αV i + (1− α)V s,
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in case (c), the pair agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
2
+
1
4
+
1
16
+
1
32
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
4
)
< αV i + (1− α)V s,
in case (d), a center agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
3
+
1
3
+
1
9
+
1
27
+
1
27
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
3
+
1
3
+
1
9
)
≤ αV i
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
,
in case (e), the center agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
3
+
1
3
+
1
6
+
1
24
+
1
48
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
3
+
1
3
+
1
6
)
< αV i
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
,
and in case (f), a periphery agent would get payoff
αV i
(
1
4
+
1
4
+
1
8
+
1
16
+
1
32
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
4
+
1
4
)
≤ αV i
(
1
2
+
1
4
)
+ (1− α)V s1
2
.
(=⇒) For this part of the proof, we need some extra notation. The payoff function in
(10) can be rewritten as
Πi (g) =
1
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
Ti,j (g) ,
where Ti,j (g) is the total payoff that j transmits to i via her direct link with i. Formally,
Ti,j (g) = α

V i
µNj (g)
+
∑
j′∈Nj(g)\{i}
∑
p ∈ Pj,j′ (g) :
i /∈ P˘
V i
µNj′ (g) ·
(
µNj (g)
)2 · ∏
k∈P˘
(µNk (g))
2

+(1− α) V
s
µNj (g)
.
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Assume that g is a pairwise stable structure. Let i be an agent in g and k ∈ NNi (g) be
such that
Ti,k (g) = min
j∈NNi (g)
Ti,j (g) .
Suppose that there exists an agent ` ∈ NNi (g) for whom it holds that
Ti,` (g) > Ti,k (g) . (11)
Deleting the link between i and k results in structure g′, where it holds that
Ti,j (g
′) ≥ Ti,j (g) , ∀j ∈ NNi (g′) ,
since k, to whom j might be (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link less, so more
informational value might flow from j to i via k. The payoff for i then becomes
Πi (g
′) =
1
µNi (g)− 1
∑
j∈NNi (g′)
Ti,j (g
′) >
1
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
Ti,j (g) = Πi (g) ,
which contradicts pairwise stability of g. It follows that
Ti,j (g) = Ti,j′ (g) , ∀j, j′ ∈ NNi (g) . (12)
Next, suppose that g contains a cycle, meaning that there exists a sequence of agents
k1, ..., kn ∈ N for whom it holds that gk1,k2 = gk2,k3 = ... = gkn−1,kn = gkn,k1 = 1. Let i be an
agent in this cycle. Deleting the link with one of i’s neighbors in the cycle, say k, results in
g′, where it holds for the other neighbor of i in the cycle, say m, that
Ti,m (g
′) > Ti,m (g) ,
since k, to whomm is (in)directly linked, has one costly direct link less, so more informational
value flows from k to i via m. Moreover,
Ti,j (g
′) ≥ Ti,j (g) , ∀j ∈ NNi (g′) .
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The payoff for i then becomes
Πi (g
′) =
1
µNi (g)− 1
∑
j∈NNi (g′)
Ti,j (g
′) >
1
µNi (g)− 1
∑
j∈NNi (g′)
Ti,j (g)
=
1
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
Ti,j (g) = Πi (g) ,
where the second equality follows from Eq. (12). This implies that g is not pairwise stable,
leading to a contradiction. We have therefore shown that g does not contain any cycle.
Suppose that g consists of components that are not stars. Since we have already shown
that g contains no cycles, all components of g are trees. In a tree the number of links is one
less than the number of agents. Moreover, in a tree there is a unique path between any two
agents. A tree that is not a star contains an agent, say i, with a neighbor h that only has
i as a neighbor, and, moreover, i is directly linked to an agent j who has another neighbor
different from i. According to Eq. (12) it holds that
Ti,h(g) = Ti,j(g).
Since h has only one neighbor, i, it follows that
Ti,h(g) = αV
i + (1− α)V s.
We will now evaluate Ti,j(g) and show it is smaller than Ti,h(g). Think of Nh(g) as a tree
with h as top agent. For players k, k′ ∈ Nh(g), player k′ is a subordinate of k, denoted
k′ ∈ S(k), if k is on the unique path from h to k′. Player k′ is a direct subordinate of k,
denoted k′ ∈ SN(k), if k′ is a subordinate of k and there is a link between k and k′. We now
write
Ti,j(g) = αT
i
i,j(g) + (1− α)T si,j(g),
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where
T si,j(g) =
V s
µNj (g)
≤ V
s
2
, (13)
and
T ii,j(g) =
V i
µNj (g)
+
∑
k∈S(j)
V i
µNk (g)(µ
N
j (g))
2
∏
k′∈p˘j,k(µ
N
k′(g))
2
,
where pj,k is the unique path between j and k.
Consider k ∈ S(i). We define the informational payoff that k receives from its successors
by
U ik(g) =
1
µNk (g)
∑
k′∈SN(k)
T ik,k′(g),
where T ik,k′(g) is defined analogously to T
i
i,j(g). We obtain a recursive relation by observing
that
T ik,k′(g) =
V i + U ik′(g)
µNk′(g)
.
We will show by induction that
U ik(g) ≤ V i(µNk (g)− 1), (14)
from which it follows that
T ik,k′(g) ≤
V i + V i(µNk′(g)− 1)
µNk′(g)
= V i,
and, consequently,
T ii,j(g) ≤ V i. (15)
Let K0 be the set of agents without subordinates. For m ≥ 1, let Km be the set of
agents with all subordinates in K0 ∪ · · · ∪Km−1. Let m′ be the smallest integer for which
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j ∈ Km′ . First consider an agent k in K0, the set of agents without subordinates. Then
U ik(g) = 0 = V
i(µNk (g)− 1), so (14) is satisfied.
Suppose that (14) holds for agents in Km, m < m′. Consider an agent k ∈ Km+1.
U ik(g) =
1
µNk (g)
∑
k′∈SN(k)
T ik,k′(g)
≤ 1
µNk (g)
∑
k′∈SN(k)
(
V i + V i(µNk′(g)− 1)
µNk′(g)
)
=
µNk (g)− 1
µNk (g)
V i ≤ 1
2
V i(µNk (g)− 1),
so (14) holds for all k ∈ S(j).
Combining (13) and (15) implies Ti,j(g) < Ti,h(g), a contradiction to Eq. (12), so g
consists of star components only.
Lemma 16 implies that these stars have at most three agents. “Stars” of a single agent
cannot be part of g, for it is always strictly beneficial for this single agent to create a link to
the center agent of another star, whereas this center agent is indifferent or improves if she is
isolated too.
Comparing these results to the social value case, clearly a smaller range of (fragmented)
structures has thus been proven to be pairwise stable in the case where transferable infor-
mational value also plays a role. Specifically, complete, wheel, and regular structures are
never pairwise stable and also the example structures in Figures 1, 2, and 3 are not stable
anymore. This may seem counter-intuitive, since apparently transferability of information
causes structures to become more fragmented and therefore less able to transfer information.
The intuition behind this finding is that the specificity property of communication is now
strong enough to prevent individuals from creating many links, because it is strengthened
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by the transferability of value. The co-author model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also
contained a type of specificity, but since it was not combined with value transferability, the
resulting stable structures were not as fragmented. Similarly, the connections model of Jack-
son and Wolinsky contained value transferability, but since it was not combined with link
specificity, the resulting structures are not fragmented at all.3
5 Welfare
In this section, the structural results from the previous sections are assessed by their impact
on welfare issues. The welfare of a network structure is defined as the sum of payoffs for
all agents. It will turn out that because of link specificity, the efficient structures are very
fragmented, regardless of whether there is transferable informational value. Furthermore,
the from a welfare point of view best and worst pairwise stable network structures are
characterized (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). We also analyze differences in welfare due to variations
in social versus informational orientation in the network (Section 5.3).
Definition 18 (welfare) The welfare provided by structure g is given by
W (g) =
∑
i∈N
Πi (g) .
Definition 19 (efficiency) The structure g is more efficient than the structure g′ if it holds
3Note that this proposition is similar to what Haller & Sarangi (2003) find in their setting with one-sided
link formation, Nash equilibrium and negative externalities on link reliability (p. 27). In contrast, most
studies find less fragmented stable structures, e.g. Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2004) find large star structures
in their setting of structural holes.
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that
W (g) > W (g′) .
5.1 Best pairwise stable structures
In the social value case, there are many pairwise stable structures. These structures are not
at all equivalent from a welfare point of view. The next proposition characterizes the most
efficient structures.
Proposition 20 In the social value case, if n is even, then the most efficient pairwise stable
structures consist of pairs only. If n is odd, then the most efficient pairwise stable structures
consist of one three-agent star and furthermore only pairs.
Proof. Since
Πi(g) =
V s
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
1
µNj (g)
,
the highest possible payoff for player i is obtained if µNj (g) = 1 for all j ∈ NNi (g). If i belongs
to a pair, then this condition holds, so a player in a pair obtains the highest payoff possible.
The highest payoff possible is therefore equal to V s. If a structure consists of only pairs, then
all players get the highest payoff possible, and as a consequence, also the welfare provided
by the structure is maximized.
If n is odd, then the structure cannot consist of pairs only. There should be at least one
player, say i, with at least two neighbors. Since pairwise stable structures are equal neighbor
degree structures, all neighbors of neighbors of i have the same degree as i, and therefore
a payoff equal to V s divided by µNi (g). The sum of the payoffs of all players is therefore
maximized if there is only one player with more than one neighbor, and this player should
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have two neighbors. The structure therefore consists of one three-agent star and furthermore
only pairs.
It is not hard to show that in the social value case, the structures identified in Propo-
sition 20 are the most efficient ones among all structures, pairwise stable or not. This
conclusion does not differ when informational value is included in the analysis. Agents that
are part of a pair obtain the highest payoff possible, αV i + (1 − α)V s, so structures with
many pairs achieve a high degree of efficiency. The next proposition characterizes the most
efficient pairwise stable structures for the case with both social and informational value.
Proposition 21 In the case with both social and informational value (0 < α < 1), if n is
even, then the most efficient pairwise stable structures consist of pairs only. If n is odd, then
the most efficient pairwise stable structures consist of one three-agent star and furthermore
only pairs.
Proof. Proposition 17 implies that all pairwise stable structures consist of disjoint star
components of two or three agents. The payoff for an agent in a pair is
αV i + (1− α)V s,
whereas the average payoff for an agent in a three-agent star is only
5
6
αV i +
2
3
(1− α)V s.
Welfare of the structure is maximized by having only pairs if n is even, and one three-agent
star and furthermore only pairs if n is odd.
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The most efficient pairwise stable structures coincide in the social value case, and the
case with social and informational value. The worst case scenarios, i.e. the least efficient
pairwise stable structures, are considerably different, as is shown in the next subsection.
5.2 Worst pairwise stable structures
In the social value case, many pairwise stable structures exist that are not efficient. The
worst-case scenario is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 22 In the social value case, the complete structure provides the lowest welfare
of all pairwise stable structures.
Proof. Since
Πi(g) =
V s
µNi (g)
∑
j∈NNi (g)
1
µNj (g)
,
and since every player has at least one link in a pairwise stable structure, the lowest payoff
possible for player i is obtained if all players j ∈ NNi (g) have maximal degree µNj (g) = n− 1.
It follows that the complete structure has the lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures.
The worst-case scenarios for the situation with both social and informational value are
described in the following proposition.
Proposition 23 In the case with both social and informational value (0 < α < 1),
(a) if n ∈ {3, 6, 9, . . .}, a structure consisting of only three-agent stars provides lowest
welfare of all pairwise stable structures,
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(b) if n ∈ {7, 10, . . .}, a structure consisting of two pairs and furthermore only three-agent
stars provides lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures,
(c) if n ∈ {5, 8, 11, . . .}, a structure consisting of one pair and furthermore only three-
agent stars provides lowest welfare of all pairwise stable structures.
Proof. Proposition 17 implies that all pairwise stable structures consist of disjoint star
components of two or three agents. The payoff for an agent in a pair is
αV i + (1− α)V s,
whereas the average payoff for an agent in a three-agent star is only
5
6
αV i +
2
3
(1− α)V s,
which implies (a), (b), and (c).
Note that the worst-case scenarios in the case with social and informational value are not
as bad as the worst-case scenario in the social value case. For any value of n, V i, and V s, the
least efficient pairwise stable structure achieves an efficiency of at least 2/3 times the most
efficient structure. In the social value case, for any value of V s, this ratio can be as bad as
1
n−1 , which tends to zero as n grows large.
5.3 Informational versus social orientation
Apparently, there are welfare differences attached to structural differences in an OCCN and
structural differences arise by its informational versus social orientation (α). Therefore, in
the following propositions different levels of α are compared. A managerial implication is
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that the welfare level provided by an OCCN can be influenced depending on how strongly
α can be influenced. In order to affect α, communication network managers could think
of modifying moderator tasks, entry policy, rules of conduct, and reward systems, hereby
emphasizing social versus informational value.
Proposition 24 The worst-case scenario for social value (α = 0) is worse than a worst-
case scenario when also a marginal amount of transferable informational value is provided
(α ↓ 0).4
Proof. For α = 0, Proposition 22 shows that the complete structure is the worst-case
scenario, which provides a total payoff of
n
n− 1V
s.
For 0 < α < 1, Proposition 23 shows that the total payoff in the worst-case scenario is at
least equal to
n
(
5
6
αV i +
2
3
(1− α)V s
)
→ n2
3
V s if α ↓ 0.
Since n ≥ 3, it holds that
n
2
3
V s >
n
n− 1V
s.
The question whether more emphasis on social aspects rather than informational aspects
is justified when maximizing welfare, depends on the ratio between V s and V i. We denote
this ratio by x, so V s = xV i.
4Note that results for the informational case (α = 1) can be derived analogously.
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Proposition 25 Consider the case with social and informational value (0 < α < 1). Then
it holds that
(a) the higher α the better the best-case as well as the worst-case scenarios if x < 1, and
(b) the lower α the better the best-case as well as the worst-case scenarios if x > 11
4
.5
Proof. If n is even, Proposition ?? implies that a structure consisting of only pairs is a
best-case scenario, which provides a total payoff of
V in ((1− x)α+ x) ,
which is increasing in α if x < 1 and decreasing in α if x > 11
4
. If n is odd, Proposition ??
implies that a structure consisting of one three-agent star and furthermore only pairs is a
best-case scenario, which provides a total payoff of
V i
((
n− 1
2
− (n− 1)x
)
α+ (n− 1)x
)
,
which, since n ≥ 3, is increasing in α if x < 1 and decreasing in α if x > 11
4
. If n = 3, 6, 9, ...
Proposition 23 implies that a structure consisting of only three-agent stars is a worst-case
scenario, which provides a total payoff of
V in
((
5
6
− 2
3
x
)
α+
2
3
x
)
,
which is increasing in α if x < 1 and decreasing in α if x > 11
4
. If n = 4, 7, 10, ..., Proposition
23 implies that a structure consisting of two pairs and furthermore only three-agent stars is
a worst-case scenario, which provides a total payoff of
V i
((
5
6
n+
2
3
−
(
2
3
n+ 1
1
3
)
x
)
α+
(
2
3
n+ 1
1
3
)
x
)
,
5For x between 1 and 1 14 , comparative statics depend on the value of n.
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which, since n ≥ 4, is increasing in α if x < 1 and decreasing in α if x > 11
4
. The proof for
n = 5, 8, 11, . . . is similar.
6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has shown that the structure of bilateral communication links within an OCCN
can be appropriately studied by using a general approach from the game-theoretic literature
of social and economic network formation where individuals trade off the cost of forming and
maintaining links against the potential rewards of doing so, which results in a stable network
structure. A combination of aspects common to OCCNs was incorporated that has not been
investigated in the literature until now. First, the negative externality of communication
specificity was included in the sense that the more direct connections an individual has to
maintain with other individuals, the less she is able to specify her attention per link within
her total time available. Therefore, her additive value for others declines with an increasing
number of links, and she also derives less additive value from others with an increasing
number of links. Second, a distinction was made between the social and informational value
of communication, where informational value is assumed to be transferable via indirect links,
whereas social value is not transferable. Analytical results derived by using the concept
of pairwise stability showed a tendency towards fragmented pairwise stable structures -
consisting of small, disjoint (star) components - which can be attributed to the joint effect
of the two aspects mentioned. Finally, it was shown that only some of the pairwise stable
structures provide optimal welfare (total payoffs), and that the relative focus on informational
versus social value of communication affects this welfare.
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Further research could study the sets of pairwise stable and efficient network structures
with other functional forms to model specificity. In the model of this paper the specificity
property of communication is such that value is divided proportionally by the number of
links that agents face, whereas other forms of specificity might be applicable to other com-
munication forms. For example, agents may have economies of scale in coping with several
links. A functional form which captures this phenomenon would for instance be given by
Πi (g) = α
∑
j∈Ni(g)
∑
p∈Pi,j(g)
V i√
µli (g) ·
√
µlj (g) ·
∏
k∈P˘i,j(p;g)
µlk (g)
+ (1− α)
∑
j∈N li(g)
V s√
µli (g) ·
√
µlj (g)
.
With this payoff function, the three-agent star component is not pairwise stable anymore,
for the two periphery agents both benefit from creating a link between them. Indeed, payoffs
with and without the link are
αV i
(
1
2
+
1
4
+
1
2
+
1
4
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1
2
+
1
2
)
> αV i
(
1√
2
+
1
2
)
+ (1− α)V s
(
1√
2
)
.
In general, economies of scale in coping with several links will diminish the fragmentation
caused by full specificity.
The stability concept used here was pairwise stability. Alternatively, the model could
be analyzed by applying the Nash concept, which assumes stability against single-agent
deviations of more than one link. If the strategies gi,j indicate with a zero or a one whether
i wants to be directly linked to j or not and again the actual links g¯i,j = min {gi,j, gj,i} are
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only formed if both agents want the link, the payoff function can be written as
Πi (g) = α
∑
j∈Ni(g¯)
∑
p∈Pi,j(g¯)
V i
µNi (g¯) · µNj (g¯) ·
∏
k∈P˘i,j(p;g¯)
(µNk (g¯))
2
+(1− α)
∑
j∈NNi (g¯)
V s
µNi (g¯) · µNj (g¯)
.
Now g¯ is defined to be a Nash network if it is supported by some g from which no single
agent can change her strategies such that she strictly improves her payoff. If n = 3, all
possible structures except for the complete one are Nash networks. For example, the empty
network is Nash since it is supported by the strategies gi,j = 0 for all i and j, even though
agents would obviously benefit by changing their strategies simultaneously. Further research
could look for a refinement of the Nash concept such that this extreme coordination problem
would not take place.
The outcome variable focused on here was the overall welfare level. It may also be inter-
esting from both a theoretical and a managerial point of view, to study the structural effects
on the actual product-, service-, or firm-related information exchanged, thus disregarding
the value derived from the social aspects of communication.
The informational versus social orientation appeared to be of managerial concern here.
The model can be extended to allow for investigating the effectiveness of other community
design issues, like introducing an expert or a social animator in the OCCN, who possibly
does not even act strategically in the link formation game. Therefore, future research could
introduce valuation heterogeneity in the sense that agents represent different values for their
fellow customers (quality heterogeneity) or have different opinions on the values of their
fellow customers (judgement heterogeneity) (e.g., Haller and Sarangi, 2003).
Thus, we hope that our current work stimulates future research in the exciting area of
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OCCNs and the role of balancing social and informational value in these communication
networks.
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